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I. INTRODUCTION

T

here is a natural tension between the Confrontation Clause's
requirement that a criminal defendant be "confronted with the
witnesses against him"' and the hearsay rule's tolerance of statements
2
made by declarants who are not present at trial. Although most hearsay
3
rules allow a declarant to be unavailable, and some even require it, only
4 and several Maryland exceptions require a
one federal hearsay exception
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Compare id. (requiring opportunity to confront witnesses), with FED. R. EVID. 803
(admitting hearsay regardless of declarant's availability), Md. Rule 5-803 (same), FED. R.
EVID. 804 (admitting hearsay if declarant is unavailable), and Md. Rule 5-804 (same).
3 See FED. R. EVID. 804; Md. Rule 5-804.
4 See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (past recollection recorded). The "requirement" of an
available declarant is mechanical, not substantive, arising out of the fact that the rule only
applies when a witness who is already testifying "now has insufficient recollection." Id.

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.2

declarant to testify. 5 In a criminal trial, therefore, it is easy to encounter a
situation in which a defendant cannot confront an unavailable declarant
whose statement nevertheless meets a hearsay exception.
From the current Supreme Court and Maryland appellate court cases
concerning the Confrontation Clause, a series of principles can be divined
to assist the busy trial judge or practitioner in quickly and accurately
analyzing Confrontation Clause issues that may arise, even in the heat of
a trial, where calm deliberation is not possible. We summarize them
below in outline form, and then we explain how the Supreme Court and
Maryland appellate courts have applied them to certain hearsay
exceptions. Finally, we dare to suggest how the principles likely will be
applied in the future to various, commonly-encountered hearsay
exceptions that the courts have not yet addressed.
II.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OVERVIEW

A. Crawford v. Washington: A New Touchstone ofAdmissibility

In 2004, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered its Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington.6 Prior to Crawford, the
controlling case was Ohio v. Roberts.7

Under Roberts, a court could

allow the admission of an unavailable declarant's statement as long as it
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability," 8 either by meeting an established
hearsay exception or possessing other particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 9 Crawford involved a tape-recorded statement to police
in which the defendant's wife described the defendant stabbing the victim
with a knife. 10 The wife was unable to testify against her husband at trial
because of the state's spousal privilege, and, as a result, the State sought
to introduce her recorded statement, which was not barred by the
privilege. 1 The trial judge, and ultimately the Washington Supreme
Court, found that, under Roberts, the statement bore the necessary indicia
of reliability, and allowed its admission.12
5 See Md. Rule 5-802.1, which allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements
as long as the declarant testifies at trial. Substantively, this rule has a federal analogue, which
also requires that the declarant testify. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (applying to statements
when "[tlhe declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement"). However, under the Federal Rules these statements are defined as
non-hearsay, as opposed to exceptions.

Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d) with Md. Rule 5-

802.1.

6 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogatedby Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, superceded by statute as

stated in Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 36 (2004).
8 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
9 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
'0 541 U.S. at 38.
"1 Id. at 40.
12

Id. at 40-41.
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The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision and held that the
Roberts test did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause.1 3 Under the new approach laid out in Crawford, merely meeting4
a hearsay exception is not enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.'
The Sixth Amendment, the Court held, guarantees the defendant the right
to confront anyone who bears testimony 15 against him, including a
hearsay declarant. 16 If a witness was absent at trial, the only way his or
her out-of-court testimonial statement could be admitted is if he or she
was unavailable' 7 and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine her.18
Because a witness, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, is one who
"bears testimony,"' 19 Crawford shifted the touchstone of admissibility
from a statement's reliability to its testimonial nature. 20 Thus, the key to
understanding Crawford's scope is understanding which statements are
testimonial. Testimony, according to Crawford, is a "solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.",2' Statements taken by police officers during an interrogation 22 are
the clearest example of testimonial statements.2 3 Beyond this, however,
the Court obliquely left "for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' 25
,24 which it did not do until
2006, when it decided Davis v. Washington.
B. Defining "Testimonial" Statements
The Supreme Court first elaborated its definition of "testimonial" in
Davis v. Washington.26 Davis turned on whether a recorded 911 call was
13
14

Id. at 60 (rejecting Roberts test).
See id. at 51 ("Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence

would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices.").
15 Id. (defining "witnesses" as "those who 'bear testimony' ") (quoting NOAH WEBSTER,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114a (1828)).
16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
17 The Court does not define "unavailable," but the rules of evidence provide detailed
definitions of when the declarant of a statement is unavailable. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a); Md.
Rule 5-804(a).
"8 Crawford,541 U.S. at 53-54.
19 See supra note 15.
20 Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.
21
22

Id. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 15, at 91 c).
The Court uses this term in the colloquial, not the technical legal sense. Id.at 53 n.4.

However, not every conversation with police is an interrogation. See Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) ("[W]e had immediately in mind [in Crawford] . . . interrogations
solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime ....
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
24 Id.at 68.
25 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
26

ri
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testimonial.2 7 During a murder trial, the State sought to introduce a 911
28
recording in which the victim identified the defendant as her attacker.
The 911 call presented a close question: Because it involved questioning
by law enforcement, it could conceivably be considered an interrogation.
However, it was made during an ongoing emergency, not an
investigation. 29 The Court held that a statement made to the police is
nontestimonial if the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary
purpose of the "interrogation" is to enable the police "to meet an ongoing
emergency.' 30 A statement is testimonial if (1) the circumstances
objectively indicate there is no ongoing emergency, and (2) the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove events relevant to
later criminal prosecution. 3 1 Because a 911 call, or at least the initial
portion of a 911 call, is not ordinarily designed to establish or prove a
past fact, but rather, to describe current circumstances, the call (or part of
the call) will normally not be testimonial.3 2
Davis developed Crawford's inchoate definition of "testimonial," but
it muddied the waters in terms of when Crawford applies. Although
judges need no longer make subjective determinations of trustworthiness,
Davis now requires them to determine what the circumstances objectively
indicate the purpose of a police interaction to be.3 3 The Davis test
clarified the definition of "testimonial" only to the extent the specific
facts of Davis required.3 4 It also intended to clarify which police
interrogationsare testimonial.3 5 Thus, although it is the Court's clearest
pronouncement to date on what is "testimonial," Davis is not entirely
clear about whether "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact ' 36 follows the objective
"primary purpose" test if it is not made to a police officer.
There is support, however, for the idea of a general "primary purpose"
test that determines if a statement is testimonial. In Crawford, the Court
listed a series of possible definitions of "testimonial," which included
"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
27
28

Id. at 817.
Id. at 817-18.

29 See id. at 823 (discussing difficulty of classifying 911 call as interrogation).
30 Id.at 822.
31 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
32 Id. at 827.
33 See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for introducing a test as
unpredictable as the Roberts test).
34 See id. at 822 (holding definition of "testimonial" "suffices to decide
the present
cases").
35 See id. (distinguishing between testimonial and nontestimonial statements "when made
in the course of police interrogation").
36 Crawford,541 U.S. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 15, at 91c).

20101

The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule

available for use at a later trial.",37 The Court has referred back to this
particular formulation in later cases.3 8 Thus, while the Court has not
articulated a comprehensive test for whether a statement is testimonial, a
common attribute to all testimonial statements is the objective likelihood
that they be used in trial.
C. Exceptions to the ConfrontationRequirement
Although Crawford extended Sixth Amendment protections to even
reliable statements of unavailable declarants, the Court did recognize that
some limits to the Confrontation Clause exist. Crawford'sholding turned
predominately on a historical analysis of the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment. 39 Any exception to the confrontation requirement that
existed when the Sixth Amendment was drafted would allow such
statements to be admitted under Crawford as well. The only possible
confrontation exception is dying declarations, 40 but the Court stopped
noted that, if dying declarations are an
short of deciding the issue, and
41
generis.
sui
are
they
exception,
The Court has recognized one additional exception on equitable, rather
42
than historical grounds, which is forfeiture by wrongdoing. The rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing admits statements when the defendant's
wrongdoing procured the declarant's unavailability, for the purpose of
preventing the declarant from testifying.4 3 The Supreme Court, in Giles
v. California,44 clarified that the forfeiture exception to the Confrontation
Clause is a narrow one. In Giles, the State introduced a murder victim's
testimonial statements at trial. 45 The California Supreme Court held that
the statements satisfied the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule embraced by
Crawford because the defendant's intentional criminal act made the

37 Id.at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae 3).
38 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (finding forensic
reports testimonial when an objective witness "would ... reasonably . . . believe that the

statement would be available for use at a later trial") (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).

39 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-57 (discussing history of the Sixth Amendment).
40 Id. at 56 n.6 ("The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations ....

Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting
even those that clearly are.") (internal citations omitted); see generally FED. R. EvID.
804(b)(2) (modem federal dying declaration exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) (modem
Maryland dying declaration exception).
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. "Sui generis" is defined as "[o]f its own kind or class;
unique or peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009).

42

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("[F]orfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds . .
43 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5).
44 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
45 Id. at 2682.
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victim unavailable.46 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, noting
that the forfeiture rule only applies when the defendant engaged in
criminal conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.47
D. ConfrontingForensicReports andAffidavits

An altogether different category of testimonial hearsay is found in
reports written by forensic analysts. The Court first addressed the
Confrontation Clause implications of these reports in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.48 In Melendez-Diaz, the State sought to prove that a
seized substance was cocaine by introducing three "certificates of
analysis," without calling the analysts who prepared the certificates as
witnesses. 49 The Court found that the certificates easily fell into the "core
class of 'testimonial' statements ' 5 ° covered by Crawford.51 Whether
referred to as "certificates," "affidavits," or something else, the
documents were clearly "solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.",52 Thus, if the
government wishes to introduce a lab report against a criminal defendant,
it may not do so unless the analyst who prepared the report testifies (or
the analyst is unavailable but was previously cross-examined).53 And,
while the analyst who prepared the report must be called, the Court
specifically rejected the notion that the prosecution must call everyone
whose testimony is relevant to establish the chain of custody, the
authenticity of the sample,
or the accuracy of the testing device used to
54
perform the analysis.

Melendez-Diaz did not explicitly resolve whether the Confrontation
Clause requires the government to make an affiant available for the
defendant to cross-examine, or whether the government must
affirmatively call the witness in its case-in-chief However, the Supreme
Court apparently answered this question when it decided Briscoe v.
Virginia55 in 2010. Briscoe involved a Virginia statute, which provided
that, when the prosecution introduces a forensic report, the
Commonwealth must produce the analyst if the defendant wishes, and the
defendant can examine him as a hostile witness.
46

Id.

41

Id. at 2683, 2693.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).

48
49

56

This allowed the

Id. at 253 1.

'o Crawford,541 U.S. at 51.
"1 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
52 Id. (quoting Crawford,541 U.S. at 51); see also supra note 21.
"

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
Id. at2532n.1.
" 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam).
56 See Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert.
grantedsub nom.,
Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009), vacatedand remanded by 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010);
54
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government to introduce forensic reports against a defendant without
calling the affiant, and it required the defendant to call the witness in her
case-in-chief if she wished to confront him. Virginia argued that the
Confrontation Clause is satisfied as long as the witness is subject to inperson cross-examination, and that the Sixth Amendment does not require
that the prosecution call the analyst in its case-in-chief.57 This position,
however, is at odds with dictum in Melendez-Diaz to the effect that the
defendant's ability to call a witness is "no substitute"5 8 for confrontation:
Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause
into the defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory
Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness noshows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to
present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse
witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by
a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex
parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the
affiants if he chooses.5 9
The Briscoe Court seems to have considered this language dispositive
because, in an unsigned order, it vacated and remanded the case to the
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
Virginia Supreme
60
Melendez-Diaz.

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (Supp. 2008) ("The accused in any hearing or trial in which a
certificate of analysis is offered into evidence .. .shall have the right to call the person
performing such analysis or examination or involved in the chain of custody as a witness
therein, and examine him in the same manner as if he had been called as an adverse witness.
Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth.").
57 See Brief for Respondent at 30-39, Magruder, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (No.
070817). Even before Briscoe, it appears that, in Maryland, the mere ability to cross-examine
a declarant at some point was not enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Cf Myer v.
State, 403 Md. 463, 943 A.2d 615 (2008). In Myer, a child sexual abuse case, the State called
the victim as its first witness. Id. at 468, 943 A.2d at 617. At the end of its case-in-chief, it
introduced into evidence a video of the victim's earlier interview with a social worker. Id. at
469, 943 A.2d at 618. Although the declarant of the statement had been present and subject to
cross-examination, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant an
opportunity to re-examine the victim about the videotaped interview. Id.at 475, 943 A.2d at
622. However, the Court of Appeals was at pains to stress that it was resolving the issue on
Maryland evidentiary, not constitutional grounds; so, while it is informative as to the general
attitude of Maryland courts it does not reflect any actual Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
See id.
58 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540.
59 Id.(emphasis added).
60 Briscoe, 130 S.Ct. 1316.
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E. The ConfrontationRight in Maryland
61
Maryland's first application of Crawford came in State v. Snowden.
Snowden is unique in that it involved a Maryland evidentiary rule that
62
does not have a federal equivalent. Maryland's "tender years" statute
allows the court to admit hearsay statements of unavailable juvenile
victims of child abuse if the statements were made to certain health or
social work professionals. In Snowden, the State called a police sexual
abuse investigator to testify to statements made to her by the defendant's
alleged sexual abuse victim. 63 The Court of Appeals determined that,
under Crawford, the proper test for determining if a statement is
testimonial is whether the statement was made under circumstances that
would lead an objective declarant to reasonably believe the statement
would be used at a later trial.64 Under this test, an ordinary declarant
would anticipate that the statements to a sexual abuse investigator would
be used to prosecute the defendant, and the admission of those statements
65
did not comport with Crawford.
Snowden did not eliminate the "tender years" statute, however,
anticipating that some statements to health or social workers would be
nontestimonial.66 State v. Lawson67 involved such a nontestimonial
statement. In Lawson, a sexual abuse victim made a statement to a social
worker, not to the police. 68 The court did not find the statement to be
testimonial. 69 Emphasizing the distinction between police and social
workers, the court noted that "[t]he mere fact that the interview was
conducted after the police investigation and that the social worker was
gathering information that ...could also be used as evidence in court is
70
not determinative regarding the testimonial nature of the encounter.',
This is not to say that the statement was nontestimonial, however, and the
court did not decide the issue. The Lawson court determined that
Crawford was satisfied because the declarant herself also testified, so the
testimonial nature of her statement to the social worker was not
determinative of the confrontation issue. 7 1 However, a year later, in

6

62

385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005).
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2008).

385 Md. at 69, 867 A.2d at 316.
Id.at 83, 867 A.2d at 325.
Id.at 84, 867 A.2d at 325.
Id.at 92, 867 A.2d at 330.
389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876 (2005).
Id.at 577, 886 A.2d at 880.
69 Id.at 589, 886 A.2d at 887 ("[Elven if the out-of-court statements were testimonial in
nature (andwe do not so hold), they were admissible because the declarant testified at trial.")
(emphasis added).
70 Id. at 588 n.9, 886 A.2d at 886 n.9.
7" Id. at 588-89, 886 A.2d at 886-87.
63

64
65
66
67
68

20101

The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule

Griner v. State,72 the Court of Special Appeals addressed the testimonial
nature of a "tender years" statement, affirmatively ruling that a statement
made to a nurse was not testimonial because it was made in the course of
receiving medical treatment.
Snowden is important to Maryland courts for two reasons. It
determined how Crawford applies to a unique Maryland statute, the
"tender years" statute, and it adopted a definition of "testimonial" that the
Supreme Court has not explicitly required. The Court of Special Appeals73
further developed this definition of "testimonial" in Marquardtv. State.
Marquardt involved a defendant charged with assault against his wife,
who invoked her spousal privilege and did not testify at trial. 74 The State
introduced several statements made by the wife prior to trial. The first
statement, made to a police officer at the hospital following the assault,
was held to be testimonial because "a reasonable person would realize
that their statements to the police incriminating [the declarant] would be
'available for use at a later trial.' ,75 The second statement admitted
against the defendant was a recorded 911 call.76 During the assault, the
defendant's wife called 911 and left the phone on, so she could yell out
her location to the dispatcher.77 The defendant could be heard yelling at
his wife in the recording. 78 Unlike the hospital statement, the 911
recording was held to be nontestimonial because the primary purpose was
to help the victim escape, not to create evidence for use at trial.7 9
Although Marquardtpredates Davis, it deals with 911 recordings along
essentially the same lines as Davis' "continuing emergency" test.
Post-Davis, the Court of Special Appeals applied the primary purpose
test in Head v. State.80 In Head, a police officer arrived at a house after
several people were shot. 81 The officer found one of the shooting victims
on the ground and, after asking the victim who had shot him, the victim
identified the defendant. 82 This statement was held to be nontestimonial
because, under Davis' subjective test, a reasonable police officer would
168 Md. App. 714, 742-43, 899 A.2d 189, 205-06 (2006).
13 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005).
14 Id. at 109, 117, 882 A.2d at 908, 913.
15 Id. at 128, 882 A.2d at 919 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 83, 867 A.2d
314,
325 (2005)); see also Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110, 125, 981 A.2d 666, 675 (2009)
(holding 911 call nontestimonial because "[t]he primary concern of a person in [the
declarant's] situation was to get help, not to create evidence for use in a future prosecution
against [the declarant]").
76 Marquardt, 164 Md. App. at 117, 882 A.2d at 913.
77 Id. at 114, 882 A.2d at
911.
71 Id. at 116, 882 A.2d at 912.
'9 ld.at 122, 882 A.2d at 916.
72

8

171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006).
ld.
- at 644, 912 A.2d at2.

82 id.
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understand the statement was made during an ongoing emergency and
would need to know who the shooter was for safety reasons.8 3 The Court
of Special Appeals also mentioned that the trial court found the statement
to be a dying declaration, 84 but, because it resolved the case under the
Davis testimonial test, it did not decide whether a dying declaration is an
exception to Crawford.
One final dimension to Maryland's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that seems at odds with both the Supreme Court and other
Maryland decisions is the treatment of forensic statements. In 2006, the
Court of Appeals decided Rollins v. State,85 which predates MelendezDiaz. In Rollins, the State introduced an autopsy report but did not call
the Assistant Medical Examiner who prepared the report.86 As required
by Crawford, the court considered whether the report was testimonial,
and it determined that the report was a nontestimonial business record.8 7
The court noted dictum in Crawford suggesting that business records are
not testimonial 88 but ultimately found that the content of a business record
will determine whether it is testimonial. 89 The court held that, "[i]f the
autopsy report contains only findings about the physical condition of the
decedent that may be fairly characterized as routine, descriptive and not
analytical, and those findings are generally reliable ... , the report may
be admitted into evidence." 90 But this holding appears inconsistent with
Davis and Snowden's emphasis on the objective purpose to which the
statement will be put. Whether reliable or not, an autopsy report is
almost always "made under circumstances that would lead an objective
declarant reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial." 9 1 Melendez-Diaz appears to settle the discrepancy left
by Rollins;92 however, as of early 2010, a Maryland court has yet to
interpret Melendez-Diaz, and the Supreme Court has yet to examine the
rule announced by Rollins.

Id. at 659, 912 A.2d at 11.
Id. at 648, 912 A.2d at 4.
85 392 Md. 455, 897 A.2d 821 (2006).
86 Id. at 465, 897 A.2d at 827.
87 Id. at 482, 510, 897 A.2d at 837, 853.
88 Id. at 473, 897 A.2d at 831. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 (2004)
("Most of the [historical] hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial-for example, business records .... ").
89 Rollins, 392 Md. at 497, 897 A.2d at 845-46.
83

84

90

91

Id.

State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 83,867 A.2d 314, 325 (2005).
Like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz, the purpose of the report in Rollins was "to
provide 'prima facie evidence' " of the victim's cause of death. Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
92

The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule

20101

F. Synthesizing the Law on Confrontation
The contours of the confrontation right under Crawford are being
determined in a piecemeal fashion, but when the cases are taken
collectively, a pattern emerges. The Supreme Court and Maryland's
Crawford decisions can be synthesized into a series of rules guiding when
out-of-court statements may be admitted against a criminal 93 defendant:
(1) A testimonial statement, defined as
a. A solemn declaration or affirmation 94
made for the purpose
fact;
some
proving
or
of establishing
b. A statement made under circumstances which would lead
the statement
an objective witness reasonably to believe
95
would be available for use at a later trial;
A statement made under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the questioning is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later prosecution, not to enable police assistance in an
ongoing emergency; 96 and
declarant
d. Affidavits and forensic reports "sworn to by the 97
before an officer authorized to administer oaths";
c.

(2) is inadmissible, unless
a. The declarant
i. Testifies and is subject to cross-examination; or
ii. The declarant is unavailable9 8 99and was previously
available for cross-examination;
or
b. The statement meets a Confrontation Clause Exception
i. Forfeiture by wrongdoing: The defendant procured
the declarant's unavailability in order to prevent
testimony; 100
93 The Confrontation Clause is inapplicable in civil cases. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
94
95

Id. at 51.
Id. at 52; Snowden, 385 Md. at 83, 867 A.2d at 325; Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App.

95, 121, 882 A.2d 900, 915 (2005).
96

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642,

660, 912 A.2d 1, 11 (2006).
97 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
98 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining
"unavailable"); Md. Rule 5-804(a) (same).
99

Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.

1oo Id. at 56; Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(6)
(forfeiture by wrongdoing exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) (same).
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ii. Possibly a dying declaration; 10 1 or
iii. The defendant has waived his or her Confrontation
Clause rights by (1) failing to object to the
introduction of the testimonial statement when
offered, 10 2 or (2) failing to adhere to notice
requirements designed to alert the prosecution that the
defendant intends to invoke his or her Confrontation
Clause rights with respect to testimonial statements,
would be admissible under the rules
which otherwise
10 3
of evidence.
This overview seeks to explain the sometimes-factious Crawford line.
However, a broad synopsis of the theoretical landscape will not resolve
specific Confrontation Clause issues as they arise. The following two
parts of this article are devoted to analyzing specific principles to aid
judges and practitioners when confrontation issues arise under the Federal
and Maryland Rules of Evidence.
III. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS:
UNAVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT NOT REQUIRED

As outlined above, the Crawford and Snowden lines of cases may be
synthesized into a series of principles that can help a busy trial judge or
practitioner in analyzing Confrontation Clause issues as they arise. This
part of the article takes that synthesis a step further and applies these
principles to the hearsay exceptions where the unavailability of the
declarant is not required. We do this first by explaining how the Supreme
Court and Maryland appellate courts have applied these principles to
specific hearsay exceptions and, then, by suggesting how these principles
will be applied to commonly encountered hearsay exceptions that the
courts have yet to examine through the lens of the Confrontation Clause.
The Maryland Rules of Evidence dealing with hearsay are generally
patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"), with certain
important differences. Maryland Rule 5-801(a)-(c) contains the familiar
hearsay formula: a statement made by a declarant at a time other than
when testifying under oath and in the presence of the factfinder, offered
for its substantive truth. The Maryland Rules part company with the
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (discussing dying declaration as possible
confrontation exception); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006) (same); FED.
R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (dying declaration exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) (same).
102 Melendez Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534 n.3.
103 Id. at 2541 ("The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause
10"

objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so.
States are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections." (citing Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977)).
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Federal Rules by rejecting the notion that the collection of "[p]rior
statement[s] by witness[es]" found in FRE 801(d)(1) 10 4 and
"[a]dmission[s] by party-opponent[s]," discussed in FRE 801(d)(2)(A)10 5
(E), are non-hearsay, as the introductory clause to FRE 801(d) asserts.
Rather, the Maryland Rules treat FRE 801(d)(1) "prior witness
statements" and FRE
801(d)(2) "admissions by party-opponents" as
06
hearsay.
admissible
The hearsay exceptions recognized by the Maryland Rules fall into
five categories: (1) the 5-802.1 "prior statements by witnesses"
exceptions; (2) the 5-803(a) "statement[s] by party-opponent[s]"
exceptions; (3) the 5-803(b) exceptions where the unavailability of the
declarant is not required; (4) the 5-804 exceptions which require the
unavailability of the declarant; and (5) the 5-803(b)(24) "residual" or
"catchall" hearsay exception.
In total, there are forty recognized
exceptions, and the federal and Maryland courts have considered only a
handful of those in the specific context of the Confrontation Clause.
Despite the large number of exceptions, there are a much smaller number
of hearsay exceptions that are used with great regularity in criminal trials,
and courts have discussed a number of those using post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause analysis.
Moreover, with regard to those
exceptions that can be expected to be involved in criminal cases and that
have not yet been analyzed under current Confrontation Clause law, they
are sufficiently similar to other exceptions that have been analyzed,
permitting accurate predictions about how courts will treat them in the
future. In the remainder of this article, we will discuss these exceptions
and offer practical guidance to judges and lawyers regarding how the
hearsay rules ought to be applied in future criminal cases consistently
with the mandates of the Confrontation Clause.

104

Those statements are: prior consistent statements made under oath at a trial, hearing,

court proceeding, or deposition, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); prior consistent statements
offered to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); and statements
of identification of a person made after having perceived the person, FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C).
105 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) ("Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if .. ") (emphasis added).
106 Maryland Rule 5-802.1 includes the same prior witness statements found
in FRE
801(d)(1), but it adds others that are absent from the federal rule (e.g., Md. Rule 5-802.1(a)(2)
(prior witness statements that have been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant); Md.
Rule 5-802.1(a)(3) (prior witness statements that have been recorded in substantially verbatim
fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the
statement); Md. Rule 5-802.1(d) (statements of prompt complaint of sexually assaultive
behavior to which the declarant was subjected if consistent with the declarant's testimony);
and Md. Rule 5-802.1 (e) (statements constituting past recollection recorded)). Maryland Rule
5-803(a) contains the identical admissions by a party-opponent found at FRE 801(d)(2)(A)(E).
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A. Rule 5-802.1 HearsayExceptions and the Confrontation Clause
As noted in the preceding section of this article, Maryland Rule 5802.1 captures the three types of statements classified as non-hearsay by
FRE 801(d)(1), augments them with some additional statements not
found in the Federal Rules, and characterizes them as hearsay, but
admissible as an exception to the general prohibition against admission of
hearsay evidence. 10 7 Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) identifies three such
statements that are admissible as substantive evidence provided the
declarant is available to testify at trial: (1) a statement inconsistent with
the declarant's trial testimony, provided it was given under oath under
penalty of perjury at "a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a
deposition"; (2) a statement inconsistent with the declarant's trial
testimony that was "reduced to writing and ... signed by the declarant";
and (3) a statement inconsistent with the declarant's trial testimony that
was "recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or
electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement."
The latter two statements were included as a result of the Court of
Appeals' 1993 decision in Nance v. State. 10 8 Additionally, Rule 5802.1(d) permits the introduction as substantive evidence of "prompt
complaint[s] of sexually assaultive behavior" that are consistent with the
victim's trial testimony, and Rule 5-802.1(c) permits the introduction as
substantive evidence of "[a] statement that is one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person."
Prior testimony, written and signed statements, contemporaneously
verbatim recorded statements, statements of prompt complaint in sexual
assault cases, and statements made identifying a person after having
perceived him or her are particularly well suited to finding their way into
criminal cases. Therefore, judges and counsel can expect to be presented
with the issue of whether these statements are substantively admissible
107 6A LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL

§ 802.1 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE].

The Maryland Rules move the three categories of out-of-court statements listed in
Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1) to a new rule, Md. Rule 5-802.1, "Hearsay Statements-Prior

Statements by Witnesses." These three categories require that the declarant testify at
the trial or hearing and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.
Because the hearsay exception for "past recollection recorded," which is codified in

Fed. R. Evid. 803(5), also contains the requirement that the declarant testify at trial,
Maryland placed that hearsay exception in Md. Rule 5-802.1.
Md. Rule 5-802.1 includes the category of prompt complaints of rape and other

sexual assault, because that exception likewise requires that the declarant testify at
trial and be subject to cross-examination regarding the out-of-court statement.
Id.

'0'

331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).
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against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause. Happily, the
answer to this question is an unequivocal "YES." The reason is quite
simple. By definition, each of the statements identified in Rule 5-802.1 is
admissible only if the declarant "testifies at the trial ... and . . . is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement."' 10 9 And, as the Supreme
Court unambiguously stated in Crawford: "Finally, we reiterate that,
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior
testimonial statements." 10
B. Rule 5-803(a) Statements by Party-Opponentand the
Confrontation Clause
Maryland Rule 5-803(a) identifies five categories of statements that
are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule and that constitute
admissions by a "party-opponent," which includes the defendant in a
criminal case. The most frequently encountered type of admission is
found at Rule 5-803(a)(1): The defendant's "own statement, in either an
individual or representative capacity." Since the defendant will be
present at trial-unless he or she is absent because of misconduct, in
which case the right of confrontation has been forfeited' "-there can be
no Confrontation Clause impediment to introducing the defendant's own
prior statements against him or her at trial. 112 And, from a logical
perspective, statements by others "of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth," Rule 5-803(a)(2), so-called "adoptive
admissions" also should be admissible without Confrontation Clause
concerns, because it is the defendant's own statement or conduct that
adopts the statement of another as his or her own.
Similarly, Rule 5-803(a)(5) identifies "[a] statement by a
coconspirator of the party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy" as a statement of a party-opponent that is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Once again, by its very nature, a
coconspirator's statement will present no Confrontation Clause issue
109 Md. Rule

i0

5-802.1.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2006); MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE,

supra note 107, § 801:lc.ii.B (Supp. 2009) ("By definition then, the hearsay exceptions
codified in Md. Rule 5-802.1, which require that the declarant testify at trial and be subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, cannot raise a confrontation clause issue.")
(citations omitted).
... MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 801:lc.ii.C(l) (Supp. 2009).
112 Id. at § 801:lc.iv.D(4)(d) (Supp. 2009) ("The admission against an accused of his or
her own out-of-court statements (as an 'admission of a party opponent') does not violate the
confrontation clause, as one cannot be heard to complain that one has no opportunity to
confront or cross-examine oneself. Consistent with this common-sense principle, the
Crawford majority cites seventeenth and eighteenth century authorities that 'a suspect's
confession could be admitted ... against himself.' ") (citations omitted).
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because it is not made with the objective expectation that it will be used
in future criminal proceedings; indeed, it is made with exactly the
opposite expectation. Thus, such statements cannot be "testimonial" for
the
Confrontation Clause purposes, and they are admissible against
113
defendant under both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause.
Rule 5-803(a)(3) identifies as admissible under the hearsay rule "[a]
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject." Once again, this hearsay exception requires
proof that the defendant did authorize the statement to be made on his or
her behalf, thus making it his or her own, and thus eliminating any
Confrontation Clause issue for the reasons already explained above.
The final example of an admission by a party-opponent identified by
Rule 5-803(a) presents potential Confrontation Clause issues.
Specifically, Rule 5-803(a)(4) recognizes as admissible as a hearsay
exception "[a] statement by the party's agent or employee made during
the agency or employment relationship concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment." This exception is different from a
statement by a person specifically authorized by the defendant to make a
statement on his or her behalf. Admissions under 5-803(a)(4) are
typically attributed to the defendant, not because he or she specifically
authorized them, but rather, as the byproduct of the agency or
employment relationship they have with the defendant and the fact that
to act on his or her behalf within a
the defendant has authorized1 them
14
range of authorized activities.'
To be sure, this hearsay exception typically is used in civil cases
against a corporate, organizational, or government entity, but there is
nothing that prevents its use in a criminal case against an individual
person who has an agent or employee. No case has been found
interpreting this exception in light of the Confrontation Clause, but it is
not difficult to imagine instances where a statement made by a
defendant's agent or employee while acting within the scope of his or her
responsibilities will in fact be "testimonial," that is to say, made with the
objective expectation that it will be used in future criminal proceedings.
If so, then an argument may be made that it is not admissible under the
Confrontation Clause unless the agent is unavailable and there was a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the agent or employee by the defendant. It
..
3 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 ("Most of the hearsay exceptions [recognized as admissible
at the time the Confrontation Clause was adopted as part of the Constitution] covered
statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example . . . statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy."); MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §
801:lc.iv.D(4)(c) (Supp. 2009).
114 See B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 153-54,
596 A.2d 640, 643 (1991); see also MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §

801(4):5 (2001) (discussing the application of Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(4)).
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is also foreseeable that courts would conclude that Rule 5-803(a)(4)
admissions were not within the scope of Confrontation Clause protections
because, assuming the foundational requirements of the rule are met, the
statements are not those of the agent or employee, but rather, are those of
the defendant. Resolution of this issue will have to await further
development in the case law.
C. Rule 5-803(b) Exceptions-Overview
The largest collection of hearsay exceptions-twenty-three in all-are
15
found at Maryland Rule 5-803(b), and-with two exceptions" -these
exceptions are largely the same as those found at FRE 803. The
exceptions found at Rule 5-803(b) all have one thing in common: They
are admissible regardless of the availability or unavailability of the
declarant. This distinguishes them from the much smaller number of
exceptions found at Rule 5-804, all of which are inadmissible unless the
declarant is unavailable. At first blush, the Rule 5-803(b) exceptions
seem like an impossibly diverse and confusing set of rules, collected with
little unifying similarity other than the fact that they may be admitted
regardless of the availability of the declarant. But, on closer examination,
it is apparent that the rules fall into four categories, and when thought of
in this fashion they are much easier to understand and use.
Category One: The exceptions that deal with perception, state
of mind, emotion, intent, and physical or mental condition,
namely: Rule 5-803(b)(1) (present sense impression); Rule 5803(b)(2) (excited utterance); Rule 5-803(b)(3) (then existing
mental, emotional or physical condition); and Rule 5-803(b)(4)
(statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment);
Category Two: The exceptions that deal with various types of
records, documents and writings, namely: Rule 5-803(b)(5)
(past recollection recorded); 1 6 Rule 5-803(b)(6) (business
records); Rule 5-803(b)(7) (the absence of an entry in a business
record, offered to prove the non-existence of a fact); Rule 5803(b)(8) (public records); Rule 5-803(b)(9) (records of vital
statistics); Rule 5-803(b)(10) (the absence of a public record or
15

The Maryland Rules of Evidence have no equivalent to FRE 803(22), which pertains to

admissibility of judgments of previous convictions offered for a purpose other than
impeachment under FRE 609. The federal equivalent of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24), which
is the Maryland version of the "catchall" or "residual" hearsay exception, is not found in FRE
803, but rather is found in its own rule, FRE 807.
116 Past recollection recorded is also addressed by Maryland Rule 5-802.1(e). See supra
note 110 and accompanying text. Since the declarant must testify in person in order for the
foundation for this exception to be established, there are no Confrontation Clause issues
associated with its use. Id.
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entry in a public record offered to prove the non-existence of a
fact); Rule 5-803(b)(1 1) (records of religious organizations); Rule
5-803(b)(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, or related
certificates); Rule 5-803(b)(13) (family records); Rule 5803(b)(14) (records of documents affecting an interest in
property); Rule 5-803(b)(15) (statements in documents affecting
an interest in property); Rule 5-803(b)(16) (ancient documents);
Rule 5-803(b)(17) (market reports and published compilations);
Rule 5-803(b)(18) (learned treatises); and Rule 5-803(b)(23)
(judgments as to personal, family, general history, or boundaries);
Cate2ory Three: The exceptions that deal with various forms of
reputation evidence, namely: Rule 5-803(b)(19) (reputation
regarding personal or family history); Rule 5-803(b)(20)
(reputation regarding general history or land boundaries); and
Rule 5-803(b)(21) (reputation regarding a person's character,
among associates or within the community); and
Category Four: The "catchall" hearsay exception found at Rule
5-803(b)(24).
The similarity of the exceptions within each of the first three categories of
rules suggests that Confrontation Clause analysis will, in most instances,
be similar for each rule within each category.
D. Category One: Exceptions Dealingwith Perception,State of Mind,
Emotion, Intent, and Physical or Mental Condition and the
Confrontation Clause
When analyzing Confrontation Clause issues associated with this first
category of hearsay exceptions found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b), the key
is to determine whether the statement meets the definition of a
"testimonial statement" as defined by Crawford and the subsequent
Confrontation Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court-namely, was
the statement made under circumstances manifesting an objective
expectation that the statement would be available for future use at a future
trial? 117 If "yes," then it will be "testimonial" in nature and inadmissible
under the Confrontation Clause, regardless of whether it is admissible
under the hearsay rules, unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, or the
defendant has waived or forfeited his or her confrontation rights.
The Supreme Court case that provides the most assistance in
determining whether the exceptions falling within this first category are
"7

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,

2529 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-23 (2006).
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testimonial or not is Davis v. Washington.118 There, the Court analyzed
statements admitted in two separate criminal trials, one (Davis v.
Washington) involving a 911 call and the other (Hammon v. Indiana)
involving a written affidavit given to the police in the course of
investigating a domestic battery complaint, to determine whether the
statements were testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. 119 The
Court held:
[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
past events potentially
interrogation is to establish or prove
1 20
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
It is noteworthy that, in the second case analyzed by the Supreme
Court in Davis (the Hammon case), the Indiana trial court had admitted
the victim's statements in the battery affidavit as present sense
impressions and excited utterances.1 2 1 Because the Supreme Court found
that these statements were testimonial and thus inadmissible under the
Confrontation Clause, 122 the Court did not discuss the hearsay issues.
But, with respect to Category One statements, Davis provides the best
guidance on how a court should rule regarding the admissibility of these
hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause.
Simply put, if a Category One statement is made under circumstances
that manifest an objective expectation that it is being made for the
purpose of establishing past events potentially relevant to future criminal
prosecution,1 23 then it will be testimonial and inadmissible, regardless of
whether it is admissible under the hearsay rules, unless the declarant is
unavailable and there was a prior opportunity by the defendant to crossexamine the declarant, or the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her
right to confront the declarant. In most instances this determination
should be an easy one to make. However, if a Category One statement is
not made to a law enforcement officer, or medical provider providing
treatment in connection with a criminal assault, then the statement was
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Idat 817.
120 Id. at 813-14.
121 id. at 819-21.
12 Id. at 820-21 (statements inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause because the
complainant failed to appear to testify, despite having been subpoenaed, and the defendant had
not been given a prior opportunity to cross-examine her).
123 Id. at 822.
118
119
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not made with the objective expectation that it will be used in a
subsequent criminal prosecution, and it will thus be nontestimonial.
Indeed, most Category One statements will not be testimonial, as they
will either be made to friends, family, or even strangers, and not to law
enforcement. Further, even those that are made in the presence of law
enforcement will not be testimonial if the statements were volunteered or
made in response to police inquiry, the focus of which was to assist the
police in meeting and resolving an emergency. It is only when the
emergency has passed and the purpose of the inquiry has shifted from
responding to the emergency to eliciting facts to establish what happened
for use in future criminal proceedings that the line between
nontestimonial and testimonial has been crossed.
For example, in State v. Lucas,124 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
was asked to decide whether statements made by a "visibly upset"
woman in response to questioning by a police officer who was
responding to a domestic call were testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.' 25 The statements had been admitted by the circuit
court judge as excited utterances under Rule 5-803(b)(2). 126 Judge
Adkins, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted that the court's task was
to "determine whether the circumstances of [the officer's] interrogation
[of the victim] objectively indicate[d] that its primary purpose was 'to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' ,,127 This
determination "requires more than a simple grammatical analysis" of the
officer's questions. 28 Instead, it turns on a number of factors including:
(1) "the timing of the statements" (whether made while the events were
occurring, or describing past events); (2) "whether [a] 'reasonable listener
would recognize that [the declarant] . . . was facing an ongoing
emergency"; (3) "the nature of what was asked and answered" (were the
statements necessary to resolve the emergency or only to learn what had
happened); and (4) "the interview's level of formality."' 1 29 After
analyzing the above factors, the court concluded that the primary purpose
of the officer's questioning of the victim was to establish or prove past
facts, rendering the statements testimonial, and, accordingly, their
admission into evidence against the defendant at trial was a violation of
the Confrontation Clause. 30
407 Md. 307, 965 A.2d 75 (2009).
Id. at 308, 965 A.2d at 76.
Id.
Id. at 323, 965 A.2d at 85 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
128 Id.
129 Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-27).
" Lucas, 407 Md. 323-34, 965 A.2d at 85 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). In
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005), decided the year before Davis,
the Court of Special Appeals, using analysis that is consistent with that employed by the Court
124
125
126
127
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In contrast, in Griner v. State,13 ' decided approximately one month
before the Supreme Court decided Davis, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland considered whether statements made by a four-year-old boy
were testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. He had made
the statements to a nurse who examined him at a hospital after he was
taken there at the direction of the police investigating whether his
32
The circuit court admitted the
grandmother had assaulted him.'
statements as those made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and
treatment under Rule 5-803(b)(4), over the objection of the defendant that
3 3 The Court of Special
they violated his Confrontation Clause rights.'
Appeals agreed, concluding that the statements were not made with the
objective expectation that they would be used in a future criminal
prosecution, but rather, had been made "as a routine preliminary
procedure necessary prior to admitting him to the pediatrics ward," and
that they were made to a registered nurse on that ward for the purpose of
assessing the boy's condition and vital signs and to assist the nurse in
34
Accordingly, they were not
administering35 necessary medication.1
1
testimonial.
In summary, when analyzing the hearsay statements falling within the
first category of statements contained in Rule 5-803(b) (those pertaining
to perception, state of mind, emotional condition, intent, physical and
mental condition, and those made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment), their admissibility under the Confrontation Clause turns on a
case-by-case, fact-specific determination of whether the statement was
made in objective expectation that it would be available for use at future
criminal proceedings, as opposed to some unrelated purpose, such as to
identify the existence and nature of an emergency to enable medical or
law enforcement personnel to respond appropriately. When the exigency
has passed and the purpose of the statement is to memorialize the facts
that occurred because they may be relevant to some future criminal
proceedings, they will be testimonial. In making this determination, as
the Lucas court stressed, the inquiry must be nuanced and multi-factored,
36 of what was asked and answered.
not a "simple grammatical analysis"
of Appeals in Lucas, concluded that statements of an assault victim recorded during a 911 call
and admitted by the trial court as excited utterances under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2) were
nontestimonial because they were recorded contemporaneously with the occurrence of the
assault and were not made in response to any questioning by the police or 911 operator.
Marquardt,164 Md. App. at 122, 882 A.2d at 916.
13 168 Md. App. 714, 899 A.2d 189 (2006).
132 Id. at 720-26, 899 A.2d at 192-96.
113 Id. at 736-37, 899 A.2d at 202.
114 Id. at 742-43, 899 A.2d at 205.
131

Id., 899 A.2d at 205-06.

136 Lucas, 407 Md. at 323, 965 A.2d at 85 (quoting State v. Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273, 1279
(Wash. 2007)).
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E. Category Two: Exceptions Dealing with Records, Documents, and
Writings and the Confrontation Clause
As noted, the vast majority of the hearsay exceptions collected in
Maryland Rule 5-803(b) deal with records, writings, and other
documents. By far, the two most important and most frequently evoked
exceptions are the business records exception, Rule 5-803(b)(6), 137 and
the public records exception, Rule 5-803(b)(8). 138
It is not an
exaggeration to say that the analysis, which governs whether business and
public records are admissible under the Confrontation Clause, will serve
equally well with the remainder of the records, documents, and writings
covered by exceptions in Rule 5-803(b).
As with all hearsay exceptions, the key to whether they are admissible
under the Confrontation Clause is to determine whether they constitute
testimonial statements. If made under circumstances where there is an
objective expectation that they will be used as evidence in a future
criminal proceeding, then the statements will be deemed to be testimonial
and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant is
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant, or the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her
137

Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) provides:

Records of regularly conducted business activity. A memorandum, report, record,
or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it was
made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the
diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular practice of that business
was to make and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A
record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or the method or
circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in the
record lacks trustworthiness. In this paragraph, "business" includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or
not conducted for profit.
138 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(8) provides:
Public Records and reports. (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a
memorandum, report, record, statement, or data compilation made by a public
agency setting forth (i) the activities of the agency; (ii) matters observed pursuant to
a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty to report; or (iii) in civil
actions and when offered against the State in criminal actions, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. (B) A
record offered pursuant to paragraph (A) may be excluded if the source of
information or the method or circumstance of the preparation of the record indicate
that the record or the information in the record lacks trustworthiness. (C) A record
of matters observed by a law enforcement person is not admissible under this
paragraph when offered against an accused in a criminal action. (D) This paragraph
does not supersede specific statutory provisions regarding the admissibility of
particular public records.
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confrontation rights. If they are not testimonial, then there will be no
Confrontation Clause hurdle to impede their admissibility, which will be
governed by the hearsay rules.
1. Business Records
Turning first to the business records exception, the very elements
needed to establish this hearsay exception provide the greatest clue as to
whether or not it will be testimonial. In essence, a record is admissible as
a business record, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6), if: (1) it was
made at or near the time of the events it describes; (2) it was made by
someone with personal knowledge (or from information provided by
someone with personal knowledge); (3) it was made and kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business 139 activity; and (4) it was the
regular practice of the business to make and keep the record. If these four
elements are met, then the record is admissible, unless the source,
140
Thus,
methods, or circumstances of its making lack trustworthiness.
the underpinnings that permit the admissibility of a business record focus
on both the regularity and routine nature of its creation and use, provided
the circumstances of its making demonstrate its reliability. These
characteristics also provide the clues for determining whether business
records pass muster under the Confrontation Clause.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that, in most
14 1
instances, business records were "by their nature ... not testimonial."
Left unanswered, however, was the question of whether business records
prepared by the government under circumstances where there was an
objective expectation that the records would be introduced into evidence
at a future criminal trial 142 would be deemed nontestimonial, as suggested
in Crawford, despite the fact that they were prepared under circumstances
that would, objectively viewed, suggest a likelihood of their use in future
criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court recently provided the answer,
139 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) defines "business" very broadly to include "business,

institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit." Under this definition, then, government agencies would qualify as a
"business," and courts frequently analyze the admissibility of a document under both the
business and public records exceptions. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455, 497, 897
A.2d 821, 845 (2006) (noting that "an autopsy report may be classified as both a business and
a public record").
140 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6).
141 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2006) ("Most of the hearsay exceptions
[recognized as admissible at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted] covered statements
that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records . . ").
142 These business records could include autopsy reports, documents prepared showing
the results of blood or chemical tests performed on drunk driving suspects, reports containing
the results of laboratory tests of crime scene evidence, or laboratory reports of tests performed
on suspected illegal drugs.
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however, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.143 In that case, the
Supreme Court considered whether certificates of analysis showing the
result of forensic examination of suspected drugs seized from the
defendant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause.144 The Court
concluded that the documents, referred to by the prosecution as
"certificates," were actually indistinguishable from affidavits, stating that
"[t]here is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within
the 'core class of testimonial statements [described in Crawford].' ,145
Accordingly, the Court stated, "[t]he 'certificates' are functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does
on direct examination,' ,146 which clearly made them testimonial. The
Court emphatically rejected the argument that the certificates were, in
essence, business records, which typically are nontestimonial, stating:
Respondent argues that the analysts' affidavits are admissible
without confrontation because they are "akin to the types of
official and business records admissible at common law." But the
affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records,
and even if they did, their authors would be subject to
confrontation nonetheless.
Documents kept in the regular course of a business may
ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. See
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). But that is not the case if the regularly
conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use
at trial. Our decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 ...
(1943), made that distinction clear. There we held that an
accident report provided by an employee of a railroad company
did not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the
regular course of the railroad's operations, it was "calculated for
use essentially in court, not in the business."
The analysts'
certificates-like police reports generated by law enforcement
officials-do not qualify as business or public records for
precisely the same reason. 147
The Court further discussed the Confrontation Clause implications of
business and official records, stating:
143

129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).

"
141
146
47

Id. at 2530.

Id. at 2532.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
Id. at 2538 (internal citations omitted). The Court also noted that "[tihe early
common-law cases [that allowed admission of business records] likewise involve records
prepared for the administration of an entity's affairs, and not for use in litigation." Id. at 2538
n.7.
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Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the
business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the
Confrontation Clause. As we stated in Crawford: "Most of the
hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were
not testimonial-for example, business records or statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy." Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but becausehaving been created for the administration of an entity's affairs
and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at
trial-they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as
business or official records, the analysts' statements hereprepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial-were testimony
were subject to confrontation
against petitioner, and the analysts
148
under the Sixth Amendment.
Thus, Melendez-Diaz provides the key for distinguishing when
business and public records are testimonial for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. Regardless of whether they may be classified as
business or public records under the hearsay rules, they are
nontestimonial if prepared for the administration of the entity's own
affairs, but testimonial if prepared for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial. In this regard, the Court seems to require more
than just foreseeability that business or public records may be introduced
into evidence in some future trial in order for them to cross the line
between nontestimonial and testimonial. Rather, the focus appears to be
on the purpose for which the record was created: If the purpose is to
create a document "for use essentially in the court"'14 9 which does
"precisely what a witness does on direct examination,"' 150 then the
business or public record will be testimonial.
However, the mere possibility or foreseeability of use in trial of a
business or public record that truly was prepared for the purpose of
proper administration of the government entity's own internal affairs
would not appear to render it testimonial, as the Court suggested in a
footnote, when it stated that, "[a]dditionally, documents prepared in the
regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as
nontestimonial records."' 151 Further, in the body of the opinion itself, the
Court stated that, at common law, "[a] clerk could by affidavit
authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but
could not do what the analysts did here: create a record for the sole
Id. at
Id. at
150 Id. at
... Id. at
141
149

2539-40 (internal citations omitted).
2538 (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)).
2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830).
2532 n.1.
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purpose of providing evidence against a defendant." 152 The Court thus
provided two examples of government business-public records that may
withstand a Confrontation Clause challenge because they are
nontestimonial: (1) documents created for the purpose of administering
the internal affairs of the government entity and (2) documents that serve
to authenticate as true and accurate copies of other records, which
themselves are nontestimonial and admissible under the Confrontation
Clause.
Maryland courts also have considered whether business and public
records are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. In
Rollins v. State,153 decided after Crawford but before Melendez-Diaz, the
Court of Appeals considered whether autopsy reports prepared by the
medical examiner's office and offered into evidence in a homicide case
were testimonial. The court ruled that the reports only would be
testimonial if they were made under circumstances that would lead an
objective person reasonably to believe that the report would be available
for use at a later criminal trial. 154 It noted that autopsy reports were not
created exclusively to be used as evidence in criminal cases but were
required by statute to be prepared in all deaths that occurred by violence,
suicide, or casualty; suddenly, if the deceased was in apparent good
155
health or unattended by a doctor; or in a suspicious or unusual manner.
The court concluded:
When the report is offered as evidence against the defendant at
trial, in a criminal case, we conclude that an autopsy report is not
per se "testimonial" in light of Crawford. The trial court must
determine whether the report contains testimonial or nontestimonial hearsay statements. The testimonial statements may
not be admitted against the defendant at trial, unless the declarant
is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-

examination.

156

It then went on to explain:
[F]indings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a
decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not analytical, which
are objectively ascertained and generally reliable and enjoy a
generic indicum[sic] of reliability, may be received into evidence
without the testimony of the examiner.
Where, however,
contested conclusions or opinions in an autopsy report are central
152

1'

Id. at 2539 (emphasis in original).

392 Md. 455, 497, 897 A.2d 821, 845-46 (2006).
Id. at 484, 897 A.2d at 838.
' Id. at 485 & n.18, 486, 897 A.2d at 838 & n.18, 839.
156 Id. at 486-87, 897 A.2d at 839.
114
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to the determination of corpus delecti or criminal agency and are
offered into evidence, they serve the same function as 1testimony
57
and trigger the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.'
However commendable the court's effort to parse through autopsy
reports line by line to divine the testimonial from the nontestimonial, it is
doubtful whether its reasoning would withstand analysis after MelendezDiaz. As noted, the standard articulated in that case was not whether the
content of the business or public record was "routine," "descriptive," or
"non-analytical," or "reliable" as opposed to "contested conclusions," but
rather, whether the purpose of making that particular record was for
administration of the internal affairs of the "business" or government
office, as opposed to recording for future litigation use the type of facts
typically testified to by witnesses at trial.' 58 What Rollins failed to
acknowledge was that, while some autopsy reports may not be prepared
with the objective expectation that they will be introduced at a future
criminal trial (say, for example, in the case of a suicide with no indication
of foul play), thus making them nontestimonial, it is a certainty that those
autopsy reports, which reach the conclusion that the cause of death was
homicide, must of necessity trigger an objective expectation that they,
with reasonable foreseeability, may be offered into evidence at a criminal
case, clearly making them testimonial. Melendez-Diaz does not stand for
the proposition that courts should consider business records generically to
determine whether or not they are testimonial, because, as Crawford
noted, 159 business records at common law are classic examples of
nontestimonial hearsay. Rather, Melendez-Diaz requires consideration of
the reason why a particularbusiness or public record or report was made,
and if, viewed objectively, it appears that it was prepared for a litigationrelated purpose, rather than for administration of the internal affairs of the
business or government office, then it will be testimonial.
Even more fundamentally, however, the approach taken in Rollins is
suspect even under Crawford, which it purported to follow, because the
Rollins court's continued use of the "reliability" of the information in an
autopsy report as a measure of whether it complies with the Sixth
Amendment 160 clashes with the unambiguous statement in Crawford: "To
be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
157

Id. at 489, 897 A.2d at 841.

158 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
159 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2006).

160 Rollins, 392 Md. 455, 497, 897 A.2d 821, 845-46 (2006) ("If the autopsy report
contains only findings about the physical condition of the decedent that may be fairly
characterized as routine, descriptive and not analytical, and those findings are generally
reliable and are afforded an indicum [sic] of reliability, the report may be admitted into
evidence without the testimony of its preparer, and without violating the Confrontation
Clause.").

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 40.2

of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in
a particular manner ....,'61 That "procedural guarantee" is appearance
at trial for cross-examination, or, if unavailable at trial, availability for
cross-examination before trial begins. Rollins appears to support the
notion that the determination of "testimonial" vel non turns on whether
particular entries in an autopsy report are "reliable" rather than "contested
or disputed," instead of the foreseeability, objectively viewed, that the
record will be used in a future criminal trial. Thus, it is unlikely that the
conclusions reached in Rollins will continue to withstand analysis
following Melendez-Diaz.

Similarly, in Costley v. State,162 decided after Rollins, but before
Melendez-Diaz, the Court of Special Appeals, citing Rollins, held that the
trial court did not commit error by admitting into evidence in a criminal
trial an unredacted autopsy report because the defendant failed to
challenge at trial the portions of the report that addressed the manner of
death or the conclusions reached by the medical examiner. Because of its
reliance on Rollins, the future usefulness of Costley is also uncertain.
2. Public Records

As already described in the preceding section, the Supreme Court and
Maryland appellate courts have analyzed the Confrontation Clause issues
associated with business records and public records simultaneously,
noting that forensic and autopsy reports could qualify as both business
and public records.163 The reason is apparent when the two rules are
examined together, as they are so structurally similar. For instance, under
the Maryland Rules, business records include "[a] "memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation,' 64 while public records include "a
memorandum, report, record, statement or data compilation" made by a
public agency.165 Also, a business record that meets the requirements of
the rule may still be excluded from evidence if "the source of information
or the method or circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate
that the information in the record lacks trustworthiness."' 166 This is
similar to a public record otherwise admissible under the rule, which may
161 Crawford, 541 U.S. at6l.

175 Md. App. 90, 125-26, 926 A.2d 769, 789-90 (2007).
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 ("Respondent argues that the analysts' affidavits are
admissible without confrontation because they are 'akin to the types of official and business
records admissible at common law.' "); Rollins, 392 Md. at 482, 897 A.2d at 836-37
(concluding that the autopsy report was admissible as both a business and a public record);
Costley, 175 Md. App. at 123, 926 A.2d at 788 (citing Rollins, 392 Md. at 491, 897 A.2d at
842).
'64 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6).
162
163

165 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A).
166 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6).
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be excluded "if the source of information or the method or circumstances
of the preparation of the record indicate that the record or the information
in the record lacks trustworthiness."' 67 Finally, Maryland Rule 5803(b)(6) defines a "business" broadly to include a "business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or
not conducted for profit." Thus, a federal, state, or local government
entity would fit into this definition of a "business."
In light of the structural similarities between the two rules and the
willingness of the courts to analyze records prepared by government
entities under the same analysis as business records for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, the lessons learned in Melendez-Diaz regarding
when business records are "testimonial," discussed in the preceding
section, apply with equal force to public records: They are testimonial if,
objectively viewed, it is reasonably foreseeable that they will be used in
future criminal proceedings against a defendant.' 68 The Supreme Court
further refined the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
business and public records as follows: "Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under
an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-having been created for
the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose 1of
69
establishing or proving some fact at trial-they are not testimonial."
The key distinction is whether the records were prepared for the internal
administration of the government entity's affairs or to be used to prove a
fact against a defendant in a criminal trial.
There is one final point to be made about the Confrontation Clause
issues associated with public records under Rule 5-803(b)(8) that
underscores the above conclusions. In essence, the public records
exception applies to three general types of records: (1) those setting forth
"the activities of the agency"; 70 (2) those setting forth "matters observed
pursuant to a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty
to report";' 7 and (3) those setting forth "in civil actions and when offered
against the State in criminal actions, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law."'1 72 Further,
with respect to the second category of public records, those setting forth
matters observed pursuant to a legally imposed duty to report, Rule 5803(b)(8)(C) states that "[a] record of matters observed by a law
enforcement person is not admissible under this paragraph when offered
167 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(B).

168

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531.

169
170

ld.at2539-40.

Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(i).
171 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(ii).
172 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iii).
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against an accused in a criminal action."
These restrictions-stated in the rule itself-dovetail entirely with the
Supreme Court's discussion in Melendez-Diaz regarding the distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial public records. Public records
containing descriptions of matters observed where there is a legal duty to
report 173 are not admissible against a defendant in a criminal case because
their purpose is to record evidence of criminal activity, not to efficiently
regulate the activities of the official entity. Similarly, findings of fact
from investigations made pursuant to authority granted by law' 74 are only
admissible in criminal cases against the State, not the defendant, for
exactly the same reason: By definition, fact findings resulting from
investigations authorized by law are created in anticipation of use in
litigation, not for the internal administration of the affairs of the creating
agency. This distinction appears to have been overlooked by the Court of
but it was
Appeals in Rollins, and Court of Special Appeals in Costley,
175
not overlooked by the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz.
3. HearsayExceptions Regarding Other Documents, Records,
and Writings Foundin Rule 5-803(b)
As noted in the introduction to this section, the hearsay exceptions
found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b) address an assortment of various
documents, records, and writings, in addition to business and public
records, including: 5-803(b)(9) (records of vital statistics); 5-803(b)(1 1)
(records of religious organizations); 5-803(b)(12) (marriage, baptismal,
and similar certificates); 5-803(b)(13) (family records); 5-803(b)(14)
(records of documents affecting an interest in property); 5-803(b)(15)
(statements in documents affecting an interest in property); 5-803(b)(16)
(statements in ancient documents); 5-803(b)(17) (market reports and
published compilations); 5-803(b)(18) (learned treatises); and 5803(b)(23) (judgment as to personal, family or general history, or
boundaries). These hearsay exceptions are far less frequently employed
than the business and public records exceptions, and, not surprisingly,
research has failed to reveal any case since Crawford in which the
Supreme Court or a Maryland court has analyzed the admissibility of
these exceptions under the Confrontation Clause. However, since each of
them shares similarities with business and public records, and since each
involves a writing of some sort, there is little doubt that their
171 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(ii).
174 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iii).
171 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 ("The analysts' certificates-like police reports
generated by law enforcement officials-do not qualify as business or public records for
precisely the same reason. See [FED. R. EvID.] 803(8) (definingpublic records as 'excluding,
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel ).") (emphasis added).
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admissibility under the Confrontation Clause would be governed by the
under the
same analysis that courts have used to evaluate admissibility
176
Confrontation Clause of business and public records.
Thus, if the documents, records, or writings were prepared with the
objective expectation that they would be used in future criminal
proceedings against an accused or for the purposes of use in litigation,
then they would be testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation
Clause, despite qualifying as hearsay exceptions, unless the declarant was
unavailable and there had been a prior opportunity for the defendant to
cross-examine the declarant, or the defendant had waived or forfeited his
or her confrontation rights. Practically speaking, however, the very
nature of most of these exceptions makes it highly unlikely that they will
be deemed to be testimonial. Records of religious organizations, family
records (such as entries made in family Bibles), certificates of baptism or
marriage, property records, ancient documents, market compilations and
directories, and learned treatises are simply not prepared with the
objective expectation that they will be used in criminal prosecutions
against an accused. Indeed, by their very nature, they are prepared for the
administration of a religious, family, government, or business purpose
and not in anticipation of use in criminal prosecutions.
Two additional exceptions found in Rule 5-803(b) also are unlikely to
raise Confrontation Clause issues for the simple reason that they do not
involve use of any out-of-court statement offered for its truth. To the
contrary, they are offered to prove the nonexistence of a fact or
nonoccurrence of an event. Rule 5-803(b)(7), 177 which pertains to
business records, and 5-803(b)(10), 178 which pertains to public records,
176

McLAmN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(l1):1 to 803(18):1 (2001 &

Supp. 2009).
177 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(7) provides:
Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with subsection (b)(6). Unless the
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness, evidence that a diligent search
disclosed that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data
compilations kept in accordance with subsection (b)(6), when offered to prove the
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind about
which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and
preserved.
178 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(10) provides:
Absence of public record or entry. Unless the circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness, evidence in the form of testimony or a certification in accordance
with Rule 5-902 that a diligent search has failed to disclose a record, report,
statement, or data compilation made by a public agency, or an entry therein, when
offered to prove the absence of such a record or entry or the nonoccurrence or
nonexistence of a matter about which a record was regularly made and preserved by
the public agency.
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permit the introduction of evidence that a diligent search has failed to
disclose the existence of a business or public record, or entry within a
business or public record, for the purposes of proving the nonexistence of
a record or nonoccurrence of an event that, had it occurred, would have
been memorialized in a business or public record. These exceptions
present no Confrontation Clause issue because there is no out-of-court
79
statement being offered.1
F. Category Three: HearsayExceptions in Rule 5-803(b) Pertainingto
Reputation and the Confrontation Clause
As stated in the introduction to this section, the third category of
hearsay exceptions, found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b), involves three
exceptions, all dealing with reputation evidence. Rule 5-803(b)(19)"8 °
addresses reputation concerning personal or family history; Rule 5803(b)(20) 18 1 addresses reputation concerning boundaries or general
history; and Rule 5-803(b)(2 1)182 addresses reputation as to character.
Since reputation evidence necessarily involves the collective judgment of
a group or community regarding-with respect to these particular rulesa person's family history, a property boundary, an historical event, or a
character trait of a person that is established over time, it seems highly
unlikely that a reputation could develop under circumstances that would
meet the definition of "testimonial" under Crawford.183 Rather, it is most
likely that the reputation evidence will be provided by a live witness at
trial who will testify as to his or her knowledge of the particular
reputation at issue and, in so doing, be available for cross-examination.
Further, from a practical perspective, the type of reputation evidence
179 MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(7):1, 803(10):l (Supp. 2009).
180 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(19) provides:

Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation, prior to the
controversy before the court, among members of a person's family by blood,
adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community,
concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, or other similar fact
of personal or family history.
181 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(20) provides:

Reputation concerning boundaries or general history.

(A) Reputation in a

community, prior to the controversy before the court, as to boundaries of, interests

in, or customs affecting lands in the community. (B) Reputation as to events of
general history important to the community, state, or nation where the
historicalevents occurred.
182 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(21) provides: "Reputation as to character.

Reputation of a

person's character among associates or in the community."
183 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(19):1, 803(21):l (Supp. 2009)

("The out-of-court statements generating reputation evidence under [these]

hearsay

exception[s] would seem clearly to be nontestimonial under Crawfordv. Washington.").
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covered by these rules would likely be introduced in criminal cases
infrequently. Accordingly, judges and practitioners can expect that these
three exceptions will seldom, if ever, be objectionable under the
Confrontation Clause.
G. Category Four: The Rule 5-803(b)(24) "Catchall" Exception
and the Confrontation Clause
The final "category" (albeit a category of one, but with infinite
possibilities) of hearsay exceptions found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b) is
8 4 It is the
the so-called "catchall exception" found at Rule 5-803(b)(24).
Maryland equivalent of FRE 807. And, although located in Rule 5-803,
the exception covers any statement "not specifically covered by any of
the hearsay exceptions listed in this Rule or in Rule 5-804," provided the
following factors are met: (1) the statement is offered to prove a "material
fact"; (2) the statement is more probative evidence of that material fact
than any other evidence that, with reasonable effort, could be procured to
prove it; (3) the general purpose of the evidence rules and the interests of
justice will be served by permitting the introduction of the evidence; and
(4) sufficient advance notice of the intent to introduce the evidence is
given to the opposing party, as well as the particulars of the statement and
the name and address of the declarant.185 It is readily apparent that this
exception, limited only by human imagination, could be abused to the
extent of trumping the established hearsay exceptions and the very rule
against admission of hearsay itself. However, the committee note for
Rule 5-803(b)(24) cautions that the rule
does not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion,
but it does provide for treating new and presently unanticipated
situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of
the specifically stated exceptions. . . . It is intended that the
184 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24) provides:
Other exceptions. Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded
by the hearsay rule: A statement not specifically covered by any of the hearsay
exceptions listed in this Rule or in Rule 5-804, but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
185 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24).
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residual hearsay exception 186
will be used very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances.
It is, therefore, apparent that two conclusions can be drawn about the
Confrontation Clause issues that may be associated with efforts to
introduce hearsay under the catchall exception: (1) if the rule is applied
as intended by its drafters, then attempts to use it will be infrequent and
only in exceptional circumstances, and (2) it is impossible to anticipate in
advance every instance where use of the rule may apply. Regardless, the
Confrontation Clause implications of this rule are rather simple. If the
hearsay statement offered under Rule 5-803(b)(24) meets the definition of
a "testimonial statement" as discussed above, then it will not be
admissible against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant is
unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or
1 87
the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her confrontation rights.
Practically speaking, judges and lawyers should compare the hearsay
statement offered under the catchall exception to the closest analog
among the existing hearsay exceptions, and then determine whether that
particular type of hearsay has been---or is likely to be-treated as
testimonial under the Supreme Court and Maryland cases.

IV. HEARSAY

EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE

In the preceding two parts of this article, we synthesized the principles
developed in the Crawford and Snowden lines of cases and then applied
them to the specific hearsay exceptions that do not require the
unavailability of the declarant. As noted throughout the article, Crawford
requires that testimonial statements made by a declarant be inadmissible
unless two conditions are satisfied.
First, the declarant must be
unavailable to testify at trial. 88 Second, the defendant must have had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 189
With limited
exception, unless both of these conditions are met, the statement will be
excluded under the Confrontation Clause, even if it is not excluded as
inadmissible hearsay. 190
This part of the article addresses the
applicability of Crawford to the hearsay exceptions that require the
declarant to be unavailable and, additionally, analyzes the limited
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause's requirement that testimonial
out-of-court statements are inadmissible.
186

Md. Rule 5-803(b) advisory committee's note.

187

McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 803(24):1 (Supp. 2009)
("'Testimonial' statements offered against an accused [under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24)]
must comply with Crawford.").
188 See supra Part II.F.
189 Id.

190

Crawford,541 U.S. at 68.

20101

The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule
A. MarylandRule 5-804 Overview

With one significant difference,' 91 the Maryland hearsay exceptions
that require the unavailability of the declarant to testify closely resemble,
if not are identical to, the federal rules from which much of these
exceptions are derived. 192 Unlike Maryland Rule 5-803, which does not
require the unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite to
admissibility, Maryland Rule 5-804 requires that the declarant of the
statement not be available to testify as a witness. More specifically, it is
not the unavailability of
the unavailability of the declarant's testimony,
rule.' 93
this
by
required
is
which
declarant,
the
Under Maryland Rule 5-804, hearsay statements will not be excluded
by the rule against hearsay, Maryland Rule 5-802, if the following is
present: (1) the declarant is "unavailable as a witness," and (2) the
statement qualifies as an exception under Maryland Rule 5-804(b).
Regarding the first condition, Rule 5-804(a) identifies five situations that
194 Judges and
qualify a declarant to be "unavailable as a witness."
practitioners should note that the examples of declarant unavailability
1 95
A
provided by Rule 5-804(a) are illustrative and not exclusive.
declarant may be unavailable because: (1) the declarant is exempted by a
claim of privilege; (2) the declarant refuses to testify; (3) the declarant
claims lack of memory; (4) the declarant is unable to testify due to death
or physical or mental infirmity; or (5) the declarant is absent from the
hearing and the proponent has been unable to procure the absent
declarant's attendance or testimony by service of process or similar
means. 96 A statement will not qualify for an exception under section (b)
of the rule if the unavailability of the witness is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement 97for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.'
'
See infra Part IV.E.
192 Compare FED. R. EVID. 804, with Md. Rule 5-804.
193 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
804.03[l] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL

EVIDENCE] ("The declarant's presence on the witness stand will not block use of his or her
extra-judicial statement if the declarant refuses to answer, exercises a privilege not to answer,
or is suffering from a mental disability or impairment of memory that results in the
'unavailability' of testimony.").
194 Md. Rule 5-804(a).
'9' Md. Rule 5-804(a) (" 'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which ...
(emphasis added).
196 Md. Rule 5-804(a). See MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 804:1 to
806(6):2 (2001 & Supp. 2009), for a discussion of the five circumstances of "unavailability"
under 5-804 and comparison to the federal rules and common law.
197 Md. Rule 5-804(a). FRE 804(a) similarly provides that a declarant is NOT unavailable
as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability or absence due to the
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the
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If the witness is, in fact, unavailable, a judge or attorney must then
look to the particular type of statement to determine if it falls under one
of five exceptions. Maryland Rule 5-804(b) provides that the following
statements may be entered in evidence and not excluded by the hearsay
rule: (1) former testimony; (2) statement under impending belief of death;
(3) statement against interest; (4) statement of personal or family history;
and (5) statements made by a witness now unavailable because of a
party's wrongdoing. Thus, if the witness is unavailable and the statement
falls under one of these five exceptions, then the statement may be
98
admitted in evidence, unless excluded for other reasons. 1
The Court in Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment demands, as
the common law required, unavailability of the declarant and prior
opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the witness. 199 The
Confrontation Clause, therefore, does not prohibit the introduction of a
prior testimonial statement for its substantive truth if the statement meets
the requirements laid out in Crawford. In criminal cases, when hearsay
statements are also "testimonial," a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation must be considered. The following sections examine the
exceptions provided by Maryland Rule 5-804(b) under such a context.
B. Rule 5-804(b)(1) FormerTestimony and the Confrontation Clause

Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(1), as does FRE 804(b)(1), provides a
specific exception to the hearsay rule concerning statements given in
former testimony. Under this exception, former testimony will not
violate the Confrontation Clause because the exception itself requires
both that the declarant be unavailable to testify and that the defendant had
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the former testimony
was given. In Williams v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland considered this precise issue, noting, "we need not make an
independent inquiry into appellant's Sixth Amendment claim because our
finding that the testimony was properly admitted under Rule 5-804(b)(1)
is necessarily predicated on a determination that appellant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant].,, 20 0 Former testimony,
unlike other exceptions, does not rely upon some set of circumstances to
witness from attending or testifying. Nevertheless, such statements will not be excluded by
the hearsay rule under FRE 804(b).
198 As for example, otherwise relevant evidence excluded by "constitutions, statutes or
these rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules." Md. Rule 5-402.
199 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
200 Williams v. State, 183 Md. App. 517, 533, 962 A.2d 440, 449 (2008), cert. granted,
408 Md. 149, 968 A.2d 1064 (Apr. 7, 2009); see also United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 443,
445 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The qualities that made [the witness'] testimony admissible under
804(b)(1) make it meet Crawford's [Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause test:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross examination.").
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substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and opportunity
to cross-examine were present in fact. The only ideal condition for the
for the jury to observe the
giving of testimony missing is the opportunity
20 1
testifying.
while
witness' demeanor
The language of both Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(1) and FRE 804(b)(1)
is essentially identical, except with respect to the way each describes the
forum in which the testimony is given. The Maryland rule includes
testimony "given as a witness in any action or proceeding or in a
deposition., 20 2 The federal rule describes testimony given at "another
' 20 3 Both rules require that
hearing of the same or a different proceeding."
the party against whom the statement is being offered have had the
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony either by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.20 4 Additionally, they both mandate that the
former hearing is substantially
issue to which the testimony related at the
20 5
case.
present
the
in
identical to the issue
In criminal cases, there must be an opportunity for the defendant to
cross-examine the witness whose former testimony from a prior trial 2is6
current trial.
now being offered against the defendant in his or her
Tactical or strategic decisions will not constitute a denial of the
opportunity to examine. Only an opportunity to develop the testimony is
required; there need not have been an actual examination of the witness
by the party or predecessor in interest. 20 7 For example, a party's choice to
See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note. However, this condition is present
if the former testimony was video recorded. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d
446, 456 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that unavailable witness' videotaped deposition "allowed the
jury to fully experience [the witness'] testimony, to view her demeanor, to hear her voice and
to determine her credibility").
202 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1). Depositions are admissible in a federal civil case under FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(a)(3) and in a federal criminal case under FED. R. GuM. P. 15(f).
203 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1).
204 FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1); see also Williams v. State, 183 Md.
201

App. 517, 531,962 A.2d 440, 448 (2008), cert. granted,408 Md. 149, 968 A.2d 1064) (2009)
("In determining the admissibility of the testimony of a witness from an earlier proceeding
under Rule 5-804(b)(1), the issue is whether the party opposing the admission had a similar
motive to cross-examine that witness at the prior proceeding, not whether he, in fact, acted on
that motive.").
205 See United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (excluding prior
testimony because of a failure to show similar motive); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416
(9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); United
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d
380, 385 (7th Cir. 1985) (factors for determining "similarity of motive" include: "(1) the type
of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial strategy, (3) the potential penalties or
financial stakes, and (4) the number of issues and parties") (citations omitted).
206 Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766, 774-75, 679 A.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1996); Williams, 183
Md. App. at 533, 962 A.2d at 449.
207 United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 861 (5th Cir. 1998); Koon, 34 F.3d at 1427;
Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 220-22, 383 A.2d 1097, 1103-04 (1978); Williams, 183 Md.
App. at 531, 962 A.2d at 447-48.
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limit or forego examination in a motion hearing or deposition will not
necessarily preclude the admissibility of testimony from the hearing or
deposition in a later trial.20 8
C. Rule 5-804(b)(2) Statements Under Belief of Impending Death and the
Confrontation Clause
In Crawford, the Court also left "for another day" the question of
whether the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay
should be applied in the dying declaration hearsay exception to the rule
prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. 20 9 Only testimonial
statements cause the out-of-court declarant to be a "witness" within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The Court noted that most hearsay
exceptions cover statements that are, by their nature, not testimonial.210
And, accordingly, most dying declarations are likely to be
nontestimonial.2 1 Moreover, the Court found authority for admitting
even those dying declarations that were testimonial, noting that dying
declarations were the only recognized criminal hearsay exception that
was well established at common law. 2 12 The Court, however, refused to
consider whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for
dying declarations. 2 13 Rather, the Court found that, if dying declarations
must be admissible under the Sixth Amendment on historical grounds,
they would be a sui generis2 14 exception. 2 15 The Court has not yet
resolved this issue.2 16
208 See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 967 (1980).
209 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
210 Id. at 56.
211 Id. at 56 n.6.
212 Id.
213
Id.
214 See supra note 41.
215 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6.
216 As discussed in Weinstein's treatise on evidence:

Some statements qualifying as dying declarations under Rule 804(b)(2) likely will
be testimonial, while others will not. The Supreme Court in Crawford found "scant
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the
accused in a criminal case." However, in the Court's view, dying declarations
presented "the one deviation" from that situation. "Although many dying
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that
clearly are." The Court found support for this view in light of the fact that dying
declarations were the only recognized criminal hearsay exception that was wellestablished at common law. However, the Court declined to decide whether the
Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. "If
this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis."
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.05[1] (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at
56 & n.6); see also People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) (finding trial court's
admission of dying declaration was not error, as Crawford seems to imply that the Sixth
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Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(2) provides that statements given under belief
of impending death are not excluded by the hearsay rule. This rule is
broader than its federal counterpart, FRE 804(b)(2), which applies only to
prosecution for homicide. 2 17 Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(2), however,
applies to "unlawful homicide, attempted homicide, or assault with intent
to commit homicide." Both apply to civil actions. 2 18 The justification
for this exception, other than need, lies in the requirement that the
declarant made the statement while believing that his or her death was
imminent, and that the statement concerned the cause or circumstances of
what the declarant believed to be his or her impending death.2 19 Under
this exception, such statements would qualify as a dying declaration even
though the "dying declarant" survives, so long as: (1) the declarant is now
unavailable to testify as a witness for any reason under Maryland Rule 5804(a), which could be, for example, "because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity"220 caused by the attack; (2) it was
the intent of the attacker to kill the declarant; (3) the declarant, at the time
the statement was made, believed that death was imminent; and (4) the
concerned the cause or circumstances of the declarant's
statement
221
belief.
There still exists a lack of guidance regarding the treatment of dying
declarations. In his treatise on evidence, Weinstein suggests:
Appellate courts will eventually either exclude dying declarations
from confrontation requirements altogether or develop rules for
determining whether a proffered dying declaration is
"testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington. In the meantime,
trial judges will have to determine whether to impose a
confrontation requirement on dying declarations, and, if so,
have been met
decide whether the Crawford requirements
222
issue.
at
declaration
concerning the particular

Amendment does not conflict with the dying declarations exception), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
834 (2005).

Compare Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2), with FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or
");Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) ("In a prosecution for an offense ... or in any civil
proceeding ....
").
action ....
219
Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933) ("Fear or even belief that illness
will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be a settled
hopeless expectation that death is near at hand, and what is said must be spoken in the hush of
its impending presence.") (internal citations omitted).
220 Md. Rule 5-804(a)(4) (emphasis added).
221 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2).
222 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.05[1] (citing Crawford, 541
217
218

U.S. at 56 n.6 (raising, but not resolving, issues concerning dying declarations)).
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However, courts have noted that no jurisdiction has excluded a
testimonial dying declaration. 223 Further, several states have specifically

allowed the declaration as an exception to the rule in Crawford.224
In 2006, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland dealt with the
admissibility of a dying declaration in Head v. State.225 In that case, the
court held that a statement made by a dying declarant to a police officer
responding to a 911 call was nontestimonial, and, thus, the defendant's
right to cross-examination was not violated.2 26 The court concluded that

"[a]ny reasonable observer would understand that [the declarant] was
facing an ongoing emergency and that the purpose of the interrogation
was to enable police assistance to meet that emergency., 227 Taken as a
whole, depending on the circumstances surrounding the declaration, some
statements admitted as dying declarations will likely be testimonial while
others will not.228 However, although the Court has not specifically ruled
on this issue, it appears that even testimonial dying declarations will be
admissible.
223 See State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 148 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Wallace v. State, 836
N.E.2d 985, 992-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("Since Crawford,we have found no jurisdiction that
has excluded a testimonial dying declaration. Several states have specifically allowed the
declaration as an exception to the rule in Crawford."); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272, 28384 (Minn. 2006)).
224
See, e.g., Gardner v. State, No. AP-75, 582, 2009 WL 3365652 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct.
21, 2009) (providing a useful summary of dying declarations and Crawford); Harkins v.
Nevada, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (Nev. 2006) ("We agree with the states that recognize dying
declarations as an exception to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right."); Wallace v. State
836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e are convinced that Crawford neither
explicitly, nor impliedly, signaled that the dying declaration exception to hearsay ran afoul of
an accused right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment."); People v. Monterroso, 101
P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) ("[I]f, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause 'is most
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding,' it follows that the common law pedigree
of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment.")
(internal citations omitted).
115
171 Md. App. 642, 659-60, 912 A.2d 1, 11 (2006). Head v. State provides
an
excellent review of Crawford and post-Crawfordcases dealing with the issues of 911 calls
and dying declarations. In Head,the court found three facts to support its conclusion:

First, as Officer George testified, the situation was "chaotic." Second, the scent of
gunpowder in the air would mean to an objective observer that the crime was very
recent and the situation was dangerous-at least potentially-because Officer
George did not know whether the criminal who shot [the declarant] was still in the
house. Third, immediately before he identified his attacker, [the declarant] was
crying for help.
Id. at 659-60, 912 A.2d at 11.
226 Id. at 659-61,912 A.2d at 11-12.
227 Id. at 659, 912 A.2d at 11 (quoting United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057, 106061 (8th Cir. 2006)).
228 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
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D. Rule 5-804(b)(3) Statement Against Interest and the
ConfrontationClause
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) allows for the admissibility of out-of-court
statements made by a declarant, which are against that declarant's
interest, provided the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Statements
against penal interest typically arise in criminal trials when offered by a
defendant who claims that the declarant committed or was involved in the
offense. 229 These statements also arise when offered by the prosecution
to establish the defendant's guilt as an accomplice of the declarant.23 °
The Maryland Rule that covers these statements, Rule 5-804(b)(3), and its
federal counterpart, FRE 804(b)(3), are identical.2 31 Each is founded on
the premise that reasonable people tend not to make statements that are
self-inculpatory, unless they believe that those statements are true.23 2
Because statements qualifying under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) may
or may not be testimonial, they require a statement-by-statement
Confrontation Clause analysis. In Crawford, the Court specifically
identified several examples of declarations against penal interests as
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 189, § 804.06[l] (citing Lilly v. Virginia,

229

527 U.S. 116 (1999)).
230

Id.

231

FRE 804(b)(3) and Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) both currently provide:
A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or propriety interest, so tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or . . . to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

In September of 2009, the Judicial Conference met and approved an amendment to FRE
804(b)(3), which, at the time, only required a defendant to make a showing of corroborating
circumstances. See Judicial Conference, Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference
2009),
27
(September
and Procedure
on Rules of Practice
Committee
(emphasis
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CombinedST Report Sept_2009.pdf
added). The proposed amendment would also "require the government to show corroborating
circumstances as a condition for admission of an unavailable declarant's statement against
penal interest." Id. (emphasis added). Upon approving the proposed amendment, the Judicial
Committee transmitted the amendment to the Supreme Court for its consideration. Id. On
Friday, April 16, 2010, the Maryland Rules Committee met to discuss the adoption of a
conforming amendment to Maryland Rule 804(b)(3), which would amend "Rule 5-804(b)(3)
by deleting the language 'to exculpate the accused' and adding the language 'in a criminal
case'." See Maryland Rules Committee, Agenda for Rules Committee Meeting (April 16,
2010), http://www.mdcourts.gov/rules/agenda/agenda.pdf.
232 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). See also FED. R. EVID. 804
advisory committee's note (citing Hileman v. Nw. Eng'g Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965))
("The circumstantial guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption
that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for
good reason that they are true.").
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The Court determined that plea allocutions were

testimonial and inadmissible.234 Confessions of an accomplice made to
law enforcement officers were also deemed testimonial, including those
that do not directly implicate the defendant.23 5 These types of statements

against interest must be excluded, unless the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable declarant.

6

If the

statements do not fall under one of the examples described in Crawford,
judges and practitioners should examine the statement to determine
whether or not it is testimonial.23 7

Whether a statement is, in fact, so contrary to the declarant's interest
such that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have

made the statement is a preliminary determination to be made by the
court, based on the circumstances of each case.2 38

In Maryland,

preliminary

questions of

determinations by the court regarding

admissibility of evidence are governed by Rule 5-104(a), which allows

the court to "decline to require strict application of the rules of evidence,
except those relating to privilege and the competency of the witness."

During the preliminary determination, when statements made by an
unavailable declarant who is subject to criminal prosecution are offered
against an accused, the declarant's motivation for making the statement
will be strictly scrutinized. 239 This rule does not, however, attempt to
codify the constitutional principle articulated in Bruton v. United
States,240 concerning statements of co-defendants offered at a joint trial
against a co-defendant. There, the Court ruled that, at a joint trial, the

admission of a co-defendant's confession that implicated the defendant

233
234
235
236

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65.

Id. at 64-65.

237

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 65.
See supra Part II.F.

238

FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee's note for FRE

804 states:
Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in
custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and
hence fail to qualify as against interest. On the other hand, the same words spoken
under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in
qualifying.
Id. (internal citations omitted). For cases discussing declarations against penal interest, see
State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996); Stewart v. State, 151 Md. App. 425,
827 A.2d 850 (2003); Nero v. State, 144 Md. App. 333, 798 A.2d 5 (2002).
239
See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980).
240 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 137 (1968).
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violated that defendant's Sixth Amendment to confront his accusers.2 4'
That issue continues to be governed by constitutional law.242
A statement containing both self-serving and disserving declarations
may be admitted in it its entirety, if the two statements are related and the
statement considered in its entirety is sufficiently trustworthy to establish
that the statement is against the declarant's interest. 243 This exception
the
indicating
clearly
circumstances
corroborating
requires
trustworthiness of an against-penal-interest statement only if the
statement is offered to exculpate the accused.2 44 However, because of
Sixth Amendment confrontation concerns, courts, even before Crawford,
have imposed a similar corroboration/trustworthiness requirement upon
statements inculpatingthe accused, as well.245
E. Rule 5-804(b)(4) Statement of Personalor Family History and the
Confrontation Clause
The Maryland and Federal rules concerning statements of personal or
family history, Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(4) and FRE 804(b)(4), are
virtually identical.24 6 The rationale for admissibility rests on the premise
that a declarant will not make a statement about the matters covered in
the exception unless it is trustworthy.24 7 Both rules govern statements
made by the declarant concerning, among other things, the declarant's
own birth; adoption; marriage; legitimacy; ancestry; or relation by blood,
adoption, or marriage, even though the declarant lacked personal
knowledge of these matters. 248 As such statements are those made by the
declarant and which generally concern only the declarant, it would seem

241
Id.
242 Id.; see also Oliver, 626 F.2d at 261 n.9.
243 MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note

107, § 804(3):1(d) (2001) (citing State v.

Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 478-82, 682 A.2d 694, 699-701 (1996) (detailed discussion); State v.
Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 16-17, 526 A.2d 955, 961-62 (1987)); see also Stewart v. State, 151 Md.
App. 425, 827 A.2d 850 (2003), cert. denied, 377 Md. 276, 833 A.2d 32 (2003).
244 Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 428-29 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Gray
v. State, 368 Md. 529, 796 A.2d 697 (2002). See supra note 231for discussion of proposed
amendments to both FRE 804(b)(3) and Maryland Rule 804(b)(3), which would extend the
corroboration requirement to the government.
245 Williamson, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (not reaching issue); United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d
1073 (11 th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 894 (1991); United States v. Condolini, 870 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1989); see Rebecca L.
Dubin, Recent Decision, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996), 57 MD. L. REV. 838 (1998)
(discussing admissibility of non-self-inculpatory statements that are not within declaration
against interest)
246 CompareMd. Rule 5-804(b)(4), with FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
247 MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 804(4): 1 (discussing admissibility
of statements of personal or family history).
248

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(4); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4).
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unlikely that the Confrontation Clause would be offended.24 9
Nevertheless, statements made by a declarant describing his or her
personal or family history may be inculpatory of an accused.2 5 ° While
infrequent, they may require a confrontation analysis to consider whether
or not the statement is testimonial.5
Statements
regarding alienage, for
25 2
testimonial.
be
to
found
been
example, have
F. Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) Forfeitureby Wrongdoing and the
Confrontation Clause
In Crawford, the Supreme Court specifically accepted the rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing and held that it extinguishes Confrontation
Clause claims on essentially equitable grounds.2 53 However, in Giles v.
2 54 the Court limited the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine for
California,
confrontation purposes. In that case, the Court considered whether
testimonial statements made by a murder victim to police before she was
killed were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.2 55 At
common law, the Court noted, there were two forms of testimonial
statements that were admissible even though there was no confrontation:
(1) dying declarations and (2) statements of a witness who was
256
"detained" or "kept away" by means or procurement of the defendant.
This second exception, also known as forfeiture by wrongdoing, required
that the defendant engage in conduct specifically designed to prevent the
witness from testifying. 257 Applying this reasoning to the facts of the
case, the Court determined that, because it was not shown that the
appellant murdered the victim with the intention of preventing her from
testifying at trial, the statements were inadmissible.2 58
In criminal cases, the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing allows the
admissibility of statements made by declarants whose unavailability to
testify was wrongfully procured by any party-the defendant or
249

But see United States v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1200 (S.D. Cal.

2004) (granting a motion in limine to "exclude an unavailable material witness's statement
made during custodial interrogation about her alienage on the ground that admission of the
statement violates Defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights").
250 See Id. at 1202-03 (finding statements regarding declarant's alienage to be testimonial
in nature).
251

See supra Part I.F.

252 Gonzalez-Marichal,317 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03.
253 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) ("[T]he rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability."); see also Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
254

255
256

257
258

128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
Id. at 2681-82.
Id. at 2682-83.
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2693.
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prosecution. 259 A defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable may
act personally or through others.2 6 ° It is sufficient "if the wrongdoing
leading to the witness's unavailability was 'in furtherance, within the
scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary and natural consequence
26 1
of an ongoing conspiracy' between the defendant and the wrongdoer."
Wrongdoing includes "coercion, undue influence, or pressure to silence
testimony." 262 A defendant who wrongfully procures the unavailability
of a witness may forfeit objections based on both hearsay and Sixth
Amendment confrontation grounds.2 63
While both the federal and state rules allow for the admission of
hearsay statements in which a witness is unavailable because of a party's
wrongdoing, the processes for determining whether a defendant has
caused a witness to be unavailable differ significantly. The federal rule
for forfeiture by wrongdoing, FRE 804(b)(6), admits a statement if the
declarant is unavailable and the statement is "offered against a party that
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." Maryland,
however, has not adopted FRE 804(b)(6) into its rules of evidence in
criminal causes.2 64 Instead, when the witness is unavailable due to a
party's wrongdoing, Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) provides that
admission of the witness' statements shall be governed by section 10-901
2 65
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.
As demonstrated below, the result is considerably more restrictive than
under FRE 804(b)(6).
1. FederalApproach to Forfeitureby Wrongdoing.
FRE 804(b)(6) provides that a "statement offered against a party that
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness" will not be
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
266
witness.
For a statement to be admissible under FRE 804(b)(6), the
259

2009).
260
261

30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 7078

(2006 & Supp.

id,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.03[7][a] (quoting United

States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000)).
262 United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002).
263 Id. at 762.
264 Witness unavailability by wrongdoing in civil cases is discussed in Maryland Rule 5804(b)(5)(A).
265 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (2006).
266 Rule intended as a "prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at
the heart of the system of justice itself.' " FED. R. EVD. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note
(quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1204 (1984)).
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following is required: (1) the declarant must be unavailable as a witness;
(2) the statement must be offered against a party that has "engaged in or
acquiesced in" wrongdoing; (3) the wrongdoing must have been intended
to, and did, procure the unavailability of the witness; 267 and (4) there must
be a nexus between the defendant's wrongful acts and the unavailability
of the witness (the wrongdoing need not be criminal activity). It is
important to note that the statement need not be one that is given under
oath or written, nor signed by the declarant.
Under the federal rules, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies
to all parties, including the government, and there appears to be no
268
limitation as to the type of criminal cause to which the rule applies.
There is no requirement to notify opposing counsel of intent to introduce
the statement. Additionally, a hearing for the purpose of making a
preliminary determination under FRE 104(a), regarding whether the
defendant caused declarant's unavailability as a witness, is not required;
however, the majority of federal courts allow a hearing. 269 Where a
hearing is permitted, when making preliminary determinations under FRE
104(a), the rules of evidence are relaxed and need not apply, except with
respect to privilege. 270 Finally, the standard of proof required for
preliminary determinations of forfeiture by wrongdoing is preponderance
of the evidence.
2. MarylandApproach to Forfeiture by Wrongdoing.
As noted, in Maryland, preliminary determinations by the court
regarding questions of admissibility of evidence, ordinarily, are governed
by Rule 5-104(a). When analyzing statements falling under the forfeiture
by wrongdoing exception, however, Maryland courts employ Rule 5804(b)(5) and section 10-901 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings

267 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687-88 (2008) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
268 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note.

269 Hearing out of the presence not required. See United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921,
926 (8th Cir. 1982) (court held that trial court need not conduct independent evidentiary
hearing but may admit testimonial hearsay of an unavailable witness "contingent upon proof
of the underlying murder by a preponderance of the evidence"-which may be established
during trial). This is similar to conditional relevance FRE 104(b) determination and FRE 403
judicial economy considerations that courts apply when determining whether to admit hearsay
statements of co-conspirators. See United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir.
2000) (sufficient evidence presented during trial to establish the defendant caused
unavailability of witness without necessity of evidentiary hearing).
270 FED. R. EvtD. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.") (emphasis added).
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Article. 271 The former adopts the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as
an exception to the hearsay rule.2 72 The latter provides a statutory
The
procedure for determining when this exception applies.2 73
requirements of this statute differ significantly from those under FRE
804(b)(6).
For a statement to be admissible under section 10-901 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article, the declarant must be unavailable as a
witness, and the statement can only be offered against a party that is
charged with a felonious crime of violence or felonious narcotics
distribution. Unlike the federal rule, a statement may not be admitted
under this section unless it was (1) "[g]iven under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a
deposition"; (2) [rJeducedto writing and signed by the declarant"; or (3)
"[r]ecorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or
electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the
statement., 274 In addition to requiring the higher clear and convincing
standard for statements admitted under this doctrine, the statute mandates
that courts apply the Maryland Rules of Evidence strictly.275
The statute also requires notice.2 76 As soon as is practicable after the
proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be unavailable,
the proponent must notify the adverse party of: (1) "[t]he intention to
offer the statement"; (2) "[t]he particulars of the statement"; and (3)
277
"[t]he identity of the witness through whom the statement is offered.,
It is only when all of these conditions have been met that a statement may
be offered as an exception under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B). As
demonstrated by a higher standard of proof, a stricter application of the
rules of evidence, and a notice requirement, the Maryland Rule and its
corresponding statute are much more restrictive than their federal
counterpart.

271

Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) ("In criminal causes in which a witness is unavailable

because of a party's wrongdoing, admission of the witness's statement under this exception is
governed by [Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article], § 10-901."); see also
Byron L. Warnken, "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing" After Crawford v. Washington: Maryland's
Approach Best Preserves the Right to Confrontation, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 203, 241-44 (2008);
Tracey L. Perrick, Comment, Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment
Jurisprudence; The Impact Across the United States and in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REV.
133, 134 n.10 (2005) (noting that "the Maryland General Assembly codified the common law
rule of forfeiture, adopting a statute that incorporates by reference Maryland Rule 5-804").
272 MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 804(6): 1(b) (Supp. 2009).
273

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (2006).

214
275
276
277

Id. at § 10-901(c)(1).
Id. at§ 10-901(b)(1).
Id. at § 10-901(c)(2).
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

Given the frequency with which the Supreme Court and Maryland
appellate courts have issued opinions regarding the contours of the
Confrontation Clause since the publication of Crawford in 2004, it is fair
to predict that they will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, at
least until the many unanswered questions about the effect of the
Confrontation Clause on the admissibility of hearsay in criminal cases
have been resolved. Recognizing this, as well as the challenges presented
to trial judges and lawyers who often must deal with these issues "on the
fly" during trial, we have attempted to provide practical and useful
guidelines that should lead to correct rulings and fair outcomes at trial.
Reduced to its essentials, the Confrontation Clause precludes
introduction as evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial statements
that are testimonial unless the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. However,
even statements that are deemed to be testimonial and for which there
was no prior opportunity for cross-examination may be admitted against a
defendant. In such instances, the Confrontation Clause will not be
violated if the defendant has forfeited his confrontation rights by his
wrongdoing, waived them by failing to object to the introduction of the
statement, or by failing to comply with statues imposing a duty to notify
the prosecution that the defendant intends to object to the introduction of
out of court testimonial statements, such as laboratory reports, unless the
declarant who made them testifies.
With regard to hearsay statements that fall within recognized
exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay, certain exceptions, such
as those found at Maryland Rule 5-802.1 always will meet Confrontation
Clause requirements because they require the presence of the declarant at
trial to insure the opportunity for cross-examination. Others, such as
Rule 5-803(a) admissions by a party-opponent usually will be
nontestimonial. Other hearsay exceptions, such as those found at
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) will withstand Confrontation Clause
challenges, even if the defendant does not testify, if they are not properly
classified as "testimonial" because, objectively viewed, when made, it
was not reasonably foreseeable that they would be used in future criminal
proceedings. As to these exceptions, no per se rule can be stated; rather,
a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis will be required to differentiate
testimonial from nontestimonial statements. Among the 5-803(b)
exceptions, those falling into the category dealing with the declarant's
perceptions, state of mind, emotion, intent, and physical or mental
condition often will not be testimonial because they will have been made
under circumstances that make it unlikely that, objectively viewed, it was
foreseeable that they would see future use as evidence in criminal
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proceedings. For those for which such use reasonably is foreseeable,
however, they will be classified as testimonial, and, therefore, excluded
under the- Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant is unavailable, and
there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination, unless confrontation
rights have been forfeited or waived.
As for the vast array of Maryland Rule 5-803(b) hearsay exceptions
that deal with various documents, records and writings, some, such a
business and public records, will be deemed to be testimonial, or not,
based on the purpose underlying their creation. If made for routine use
by the entity or person for whose benefit they were created, they can be
expected to be nontestimonial. If, however, prepared for purposes of use
in criminal proceedings, such as crime lab or similar forensic records,
they will be testimonial and subject to the restrictions of the
For these hearsay exceptions, the key
Confrontation Clause.
determinative factor is to avoid reliance on labels such as "business" or
"public" records, but instead to focus on the purpose underlying the
particular record's creation. Specifically, the essential question is
whether the document or record was prepared for the purpose of proving
factual matters in a criminal case. If evidentiary use is reasonably
foreseeable at the time of preparation, then, once again, the restrictions of
the Confrontation Clause will apply. Finally, Maryland Rule 5-803(b)
exceptions dealing with reputation evidence have in common the indicia
of having been made under circumstances that usually will result in a
finding that they are not testimonial.
The five hearsay exceptions found at Maryland Rule 5-804(b) all
involve unavailable declarants and will be exempt from Confrontation
Clause restrictions only if not testimonial, again requiring case-by-case
evaluation. Of these exceptions, prior testimony of an unavailable
declarant always will meet Confrontation Clause requirements because
the declarant will have had to have been available for cross-examination
at the earlier trial or court proceeding. Dying declarations could be
deemed to be testimonial or nontestimonial, depending on the
circumstances surrounding their making, but they may also be sui generis
exceptions to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause because they
were well recognized at common law at the time of the enactment of the
Sixth Amendment. Statements of unavailable declarants that are against
their penal, proprietary, or pecuniary interests when made may be
testimonial, or not, depending on the circumstances surrounding their
making, and the foreseeability of their being used in subsequent criminal
proceedings. Statements of personal or family history, which generally
are unlikely to pose a confrontation problem, may sometimes be
testimonial, as was the case in Gonzalez-Marichal, where the hearsay
statement of an unavailable witness that she was a Mexican citizen at the
time she was illegally transported into the United States-an essential
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element of transportation of illegal immigrants-was found to be
testimonial. And, finally, when the strict procedural requirements of
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) have been satisfied, then the statement of
an unavailable declarant may be admitted against a defendant without
violating the Confrontation Clause, if the declarants' unavailability was
procured by the defendant's own misconduct, which results in the
forfeiture of confrontation rights.
It is hoped that our ambitions in writing this article have been fulfilled,
and that it will provide a practical and helpful guide for judges and
lawyers charged with applying the rules of evidence in criminal cases, for
whom we have the greatest respect and highest regard.

